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Abstract
This paper studies the performance of portfolio rules in incomplete
markets for long-lived assets with endogenous prices. The dynamics
of wealth shares in the process of repeated reinvestment of wealth is
modelled as a random dynamical systems. The performance of a port-
folio rule is determined by the wealth share eventually conquered in
competition with other rules. We derive necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the evolutionary stability of portfolio rules when dividends
are Markov or, in particular, i.i.d. These local stability conditions
leads to a unique evolutionary stable strategy for which an explicit
representation is given. It is further demonstrated that mean-variance
optimization is not evolutionary stable while the CAPM-rule always
imitates the best portfolio rule and survives.
JEL-Classification: G11, D52, D81.
Keywords: evolutionary finance, portfolio theory, incomplete markets.
2
1 Introduction
We study an incomplete asset market where a finite number of portfolio rules
manage capital by iteratively reinvesting in a fixed set of long-lived assets. In
every period assets pay dividends according to the realization of a stationary
Markov process in discrete time. In addition to the exogenous wealth increase
due to dividends, portfolio rules face endogenously determined capital gains
or losses. Portfolio rules are encoded as non-negative vectors of expenditure
shares for assets. The set of portfolio rules considered is not restricted to
those generated by expected utility maximization. It may as well include
investment rules favored by behavioral finance models. Indeed any portfolio
rule that is adapted to the information filtration is allowed in our framework.
Portfolio rules compete for market capital that is given by the total value of
all assets in every period in time. The endogenous price process provides a
market selection mechanism along which some strategies gain market capital
while others lose.
The power of evolutionary ideas in finance has been recognized by Fried-
man (1953) and Fama (1965) a long time ago. They argued that the market
naturally selects for rational strategies, which, in effect, would lead to market
efficiency. Rigorous applications of evolutionary reasoning to financial mar-
kets, however, are quite recent. Many time series properties of asset prices,
for example, have found an explanation by evolutionary reasoning based on
computer simulations (see for example Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer,
and Taylor (1997), LeBaron, Arthur, and Palmer (1999), Brock and Hommes
(1997), and Lux (1994), among others). For alternative approaches based on
replicator dynamics and evolutionary game theory see Farmer and Lo (1999)
and Friedman (2001).
The aim of our paper is to contribute to a Darwinian theory of portfolio
selection, or evolutionary portfolio theory. This theory views asset mar-
kets as being stratified according to the portfolio rules that investors use to
manage wealth. With every such rule (mean-variance rule, growth-optimal
rule, CAPM-rule, naive diversification, prospect theory based rules, relative-
dividends rule, for example) a certain amount of wealth is being managed.
In our model the impact of any such rule on market prices is proportional to
the amount of wealth managed by the rule. In a Darwinian model two forces
are at work: one reducing the variety of species and one increasing it. In our
model the first such force is the endogenous return process acting as a mar-
ket selection mechanism that determines the evolution of wealth managed by
the portfolio rules. Secondly, any system of portfolio rules that is selected
by the market selection process is checked for its evolutionary stability, i.e.
it is checked whether the innovation of a new portfolio rule with very little
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initial wealth can grow against the incumbent rule.
The Darwinian theory of asset markets seems to describe very well a mod-
ern asset market in which most of the available capital is invested by dele-
gated management. Indeed investors typically choose funds by the portfolio
rules, also called “styles,” according to which the money is invested. Style
consistency appears nowadays to be one of the most important features in
monitoring fund managers.
In this paper we derive a description of the market selection process from a
random dynamical systems perspective. In each period in time the evolution
of the distribution of market capital, i.e. wealth shares, is determined by a
map that depends on the exogenous process determining the asset payoffs.
An equilibrium in this model is provided by a distribution of wealth shares
across portfolio rules that is invariant under the market selection process.
It turns out that (provided there are no redundant assets) every invariant
distribution of market shares is generated by a monomorphic population, i.e.
all traders with strictly positive wealth use the same portfolio rule at such
equilibrium. A criterion for evolutionary stability as well as evolutionary
instability is derived for such monomorphic populations. Roughly speaking
a portfolio rule is evolutionary stable if it has the highest exponential growth
rate in any population where itself determines market prices. This implies
that an evolutionary stable investment strategy is robustness against the
entry of new portfolio rules. In a sense an evolutionary stable population
plays the “best response against itself.”
The stability criterium for the robustness of invariant distributions with
respect to the entry of new portfolio rules singles out one portfolio rule,
denoted λ∗, that is the unique evolutionary stable strategy, i.e. it drives out
any mutation. Moreover, any other investment strategy can successfully be
invaded by a slightly changed strategy. According to this rule one should
divide wealth proportionally to the expected relative dividends of the assets.
An explicit formula for this rule is given—applicable in actual markets.
The effect of this rule on asset prices is equalization of assets’ expected
relative returns—in particular asset pricing is log-optimal (Long Jr. 1990), i.e.
the same prices would be obtained in a standard asset pricing model with
a representative consumer having a logarithmic von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function. Hence the portfolio rule λ∗ could also be obtained as the
outcome of a completely rational market. Indeed λ∗ is a simple value strategy
that practitioners favor for long run investments (for a similar strategy see
e.g. Spare and Ciotti (1999)).
One implication of our main results is that a rational market is evolution-
ary stable while an irrational market is evolutionary unstable. In particular
we show that any irrational market can already be destabilized by small
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changes in the existing strategies. A further implication of our evolutionary
stability results is that among all proportional investment strategies only λ∗
can be a candidate for a rule that starting from any initial distribution of
wealth gathers total market wealth in the long-run in competition with any
set of other portfolio rules. Indeed, global stability of the rule λ∗ has recently
been demonstrated for the case of short-lived assets (Evstigneev, Hens, and
Schenk-Hoppe´ 2002). Simulations with simple strategies show that also with
long-lived assets λ∗ is the unique portfolio rule which among all simple strate-
gies is able to gather total market wealth (Hens, Schenk-Hoppe´, and Stalder
2002). An analytical proof of this finding is still warranted.
We also apply the stability criterium obtained here to demonstrate that
mean-variance optimization can be invaded by any completely diversified
portfolio rule while the CAPM-rule, which prescribes buying the market
portfolio, is able to always imitate the best portfolio rule and thus survives.
Our approach complements the recent work by Blume and Easley (2001)
and Sandroni (2000) who consider an infinite horizon stochastic exchange
economy with short-lived assets and complete markets. Agents maximize
expected discounted utility from consumption over the infinite time horizon.
The solution concept used in this literature is a competitive equilibrium
with rational expectations. It turns out that those consumers who predict
correctly the probability of the occurrence of the states of the world will
drive out all other consumers. However, as Blume and Easley (2001) made
perfectly clear, this result is ultimately linked to Pareto-efficiency. Complete
markets are therefore essential in their approach.
Besides considering the more general case of incomplete markets, the ap-
proach presented here is also quite different as it pursues a dynamical systems
perspective which is not compatible with correct anticipation of future prices
as in a competitive equilibrium with rational expectations. This is simply be-
cause in a rational expectations equilibrium the outcomes anticipated for the
future determine the current outcome (time is running backwards) while in
a dynamical system the outcome of the current period determines the future
outcomes (time is running forwards). Moreover, we consider consumption
and portfolio decisions as two separate aspects of investments that should be
kept conceptually distinct. Since this paper focuses on the portfolio selection
problem, we assume that all rules considered have some identical and exoge-
nously given consumption rate. As Epstein and Zin (1989) have argued this
is well compatible with expected utility maximization.
While with rational expectations equilibrium allocations in the case of
short-lived and of long-lived assets are equivalent, allowing for rational and
irrational strategies the case of long-lived assets is very different from the
case of short-lived assets. With all types of behavior prices can depart from
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their fundamental values (bubbles and crashes) which is a potential threat
to rational strategies. Indeed recent results in behavioral finance, for exam-
ple Shleifer (2000, Chap. 2.2), show that under specific circumstances noise
traders can earn a higher average rate of return than rational arbitrageurs.
This phenomenon, called “noise trader risk”, is one of the core questions
in evolutionary finance. It can only be answered in a general model of the
market selection process allowing for all types of strategies.
Our approach relates closely to the classical finance approach to maximize
the expected growth rate of wealth for some exogenously given return process.
In a sense we show which portfolio rule turns out to maximize the expected
growth rate of wealth in a model with endogenously determined returns.
Hakansson (1970), Thorp (1971), Algoet and Cover (1988), and Karatzas
and Shreve (1998), among others, have explored this maximum growth per-
spective. Computing the maximum growth portfolio is a non-trivial problem.
Even if one restricts attention to i.i.d. returns, when markets are incomplete,
there is no explicit solution to this investment problem in general. Numerical
algorithms to compute the maximum growth portfolio have been provided
by Algoet and Cover (1988) and Cover (1984, 1991). Our result is interesting
also in this respect because the simple portfolio rule that we obtain shows
that considering the equilibrium consequences of expected growth rate max-
imization does not make matters more complicated but rather much easier.
Indeed, as mentioned above, the portfolio rule λ∗ can be characterized as the
unique portfolio rule that maximizes its growth rate of wealth in a population
in which the rule itself determines the returns.
The next section presents the economic model which has the mathemat-
ical structure of a random dynamical system. The model is based on Lucas
(1978)’s infinite horizon asset market model with long-lived assets and a sin-
gle perishable consumption good. In this model we introduce heterogenous
portfolio rules that are adapted to the information filtration, and we study
the resulting sequence of short run equilibria. In section 3 we define the
long run equilibrium concepts and different stability notions. In particular
we define invariant distributions of relative wealth and show that those are
characterized by monomorphic populations, i.e. an invariant distribution of
relative wealth arise if and only if all investors use the same portfolio rule.
Then we define evolutionary stability of invariant distributions of relative
wealth as those being robust to the innovation of new strategies. Section 4
contains the main results. For various degrees of complexity on the dividend
process and the portfolio rules we show that the relative dividends rule λ∗ is
the unique evolutionary stable strategy. Section 5 analyzes the evolutionary
stability of portfolio rules based on mean-variance optimization. We study
the issue of under-diversified portfolios, and discuss the implication of the
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CAPM investment strategy. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Evolutionary Stock Market Model
This section introduces an infinite horizon asset market model with long-
lived assets and a single perishable consumption good, as in the seminal
paper Lucas (1978).
There are K ≥ 1 long-lived assets and cash. Time is discrete and denoted
by t = 0, 1, ... . Each asset k = 1, ..., K pays off a dividend per share at the
beginning of every period and before trade takes place in this period. Dkt ≥ 0
denotes the total dividend paid to all shareholders of asset k at the beginning
of period t. We assume that
∑
kD
k
t > 0.
1 Dkt depends on the history of states
of the world ωt = (..., ω0, ..., ωt) where ωt ∈ S is the state revealed at the
beginning of period t. It is for technical convenience (and without loss of
generality) to assume infinite histories. S is assumed to be finite, and every
state is drawn with some strictly positive probability.
Dividend payoffs are in terms of cash. Cash is only used to buy consump-
tion goods—in particular it cannot be used to store value. Assets are issued
at time 0. The initial supply of every asset k, sk0, is normalized to 1. At any
period in time the supply remains constant: skt = s
k
0. The supply of cash s
0
t
is given by the total dividends of all assets.
There are finitely many portfolio rules (also referred to as investment
strategies) indexed by i = 1, ..., I, I ≥ 2, each is pursued by an investor.
The portfolio rule of investor i is a time- and history-dependent proportional
strategy, denoted by λit(ω
t) = (λit,k(ω
t))k=0,...,K with 0 ≤ λit,k(ωt) ≤ 1 for
all k and
∑K
k=0 λ
i
t,k(ω
t) = 1. For each k ≥ 1, λit,k(ωt) is the fraction of the
wealth investor i assigns to the purchase of the risky asset k in period t,
while λit,0(ω
t) is the fraction of wealth held in cash. Investment strategies are
distinct across investors2.
In the following discussion we assume that everything is well-defined. In
particular prices are assumed to be strictly positive. A general result along
with sufficient conditions are provided the full derivation of the model.
For a given portfolio rule λit(ω
t) and wealth wit, the portfolio purchased
by investor i at the beginning of period t is given by
θit,k =
λit,k(ω
t)wit
pkt
k = 0, 1, ..., K. (1)
1This assumption avoids “dead” periods in which no dividends are paid.
2The case of investors pursuing the same portfolio rule can be handled as follows:
Investors with the same strategy set up a fund with claims equal to their initial share.
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θit,0 is the units of cash and θ
i
t,k is the units of assets held by investor i.
Since we have normalized the supply of the long-lived assets to 1, θit,k is the
percentage of all shares issued of asset k that investor i purchases. pkt denotes
the market clearing price of asset k in period t. We normalize the price for
cash p0t = 1 in every period t. The price of the consumption good is also the
numeraire.
For any portfolio holdings of agents (θit)i=1,...,I the market equilibrium
conditions for cash and long-lived assets are given by
I∑
i=1
θit,k = s
k
t , k = 0, ..., K, (2)
where the supply of the risky assets is skt = 1, while the supply of cash is
given by
s0t =
K∑
k=1
Dkt (ω
t) > 0 (3)
with strict positivity by the assumption that at least one asset pays a divi-
dend.
The budget constraint of investor i in every period t = 0, 1, ...
K∑
k=0
pkt θ
i
t,k = w
i
t (4)
is fulfilled since the fractions λit,k(ω
t), k = 0, ..., K, add up to one, see (1).
Since the consumption good is perishable, the wealth of investor i (in
terms of the price of the consumption good) at the beginning of period t+1
and after dividends are payed turns out to be given by
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(Dkt+1(ω
t+1) + pkt+1) θ
i
t,k (5)
Wealth can change over time because of dividend payments and capital gains.
Since the cash θit,0 held by every investor is consumed, the amount of cash
available in any one period stems only from the current’s period dividend
payments.
The market-clearing price pkt for the risky assets (k ≥ 1) can be derived
from (2) by inserting (1). One finds
pkt =
I∑
i=1
λit,k(ω
t)wit = λt,k(ω
t)wt (6)
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where λt,k = (λ
1
t,k, ..., λ
I
t,k) and w
T
t = (w
1
t , ..., w
I
t ).
Inserting (1) and (6) in (5) one obtains
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(
Dkt+1(ω
t+1) + λt+1,k(ω
t+1)wt+1
) λit,k(ωt)wit
λt,k(ωt)wt
(7)
This is an implicit equation for the wealth of each investor i, wit+1, for a
given distribution of wealth wt across investors. It is convenient for the
further analysis to define
Ait =
K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1)
λit,k(ω
t)wit
λt,k(ωt)wt
, and Bi,kt =
λit,k(ω
t)wit
λt,k(ωt)wt
(8)
The time index refers to the dependence on wealth: Ait and B
i,k
t both depend
on the wealth in period t. (7) can now be written as
wit+1 = A
i
t +
K∑
k=1
Bi,kt λt+1,k(ω
t+1)wt+1 (9)
and thus
wt+1 = At +Bt Λt+1(ω
t+1)wt+1 (10)
where Λt+1(ω
t+1)T = (λt+1,1(ω
t+1)T , ..., λt+1,K(ω
t+1)T ) ∈ RI×K is the matrix
of portfolio rules, and Bt ∈ RI×K is the matrix of portfolios in period t.
ATt = (A
1
t , ..., A
I
t ) ∈ RI are the dividends payments, and Bt Λt+1(ωt+1)wt+1
are the capital gains.
Solving (9) gives an explicit law of motion governing the distribution of
wealth across strategies. One has
wt+1 =
[
Id−Bt Λt+1(ωt+1)
]−1
At (11)
(assuming existence of the inverse matrix) with Id being the identity matrix
in RI×I . The following result ensures that the evolution of wealth (11) is
well-defined.
The following assumptions are imposed.
(A.1) Every investor consumes but less than entire wealth: 0 < λit,0(ω
t) <
1 for all i, t and ωt.
(A.2) There is at least one investor with a complete-diversification strat-
egy, i.e. there is a j such that λjt,k(ω
t) > 0 for all k = 1, ..., K, t and ωt.
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Proposition 1 Suppose w0 > 0, (A.1) holds, and (A.2) is satisfied for some
investors with wj0 > 0. Then (11) is well-defined in all periods in time and,
for every i = 1, ..., I, wit > 0 if and only if w
i
0 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. It suffices to prove the following: Suppose wt > 0,
(A.1) holds, and (A.2) is satisfied for some investor with wjt > 0. Then (11)
is well-defined, wt+1 > 0, and, moreover, w
i
t+1 > 0 if and only if w
i
t > 0 for
every i = 1, ..., I.
We show first that the matrix C := Id−Bt Λt+1(ωt+1) is invertible by prov-
ing that it has a column dominant diagonal Murata (1977, Corollary p. 22).
C has entries
Cjj = 1−
K∑
k=1
λ¯jk
λjkw
j
λkw
and Cij = −
K∑
k=1
λ¯jk
λikw
i
λkw
(i 6= j)
on the diagonal and off-diagonal, respectively, where λ¯ik = λ
i
t+1,k(ω
t+1), λik =
λit,k(ω
t), and w = wt for notational ease. All entries are well-defined because
prices λkw ≥ λjkwj > 0 (for some j) by our assumption.
The condition for a column dominant diagonal is in particular satisfied,
if for every j = 1, ..., I,
|Cjj| >
∑
i 6=j
|Cij| (12)
Off-diagonal entries are obviously non-positive, i.e. Cij ≤ 0 for i 6= j. The
diagonal elements are strictly positive, i.e. Cjj > 0, since 0 ≤ λjkwj/(λkw) ≤ 1
and therefore
Cjj ≥ 1−
K∑
k=1
λ¯jk = 1− (1− λ¯j0) = λ¯j0 > 0
according to assumption (A.1).
Thus (12) is equivalent to,
1 >
I∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
λ¯jk
λikw
i
λkw
(13)
Since the right-hand side of the last equation is given by
K∑
k=1
λ¯jk
I∑
i=1
λikw
i
λkw
=
K∑
k=1
λ¯jk = 1− λ¯j0
and λ¯j0 > 0 by assumption, (13) holds true. Thus C is invertible.
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The matrix C has strictly positive diagonal entries and non-positive off-
diagonal entries. Thus, Murata (1977, Theorem 23, p. 24) ensures that
wt+1 ≥ 0 if At ≥ 0 (see (8) for the definition of At). Clearly, At ≥ 0 if
wt ≥ 0. This observation implies λt+1,k(ωt+1)wt+1 ≥ 0 for all k.
Let (A.2) hold for investor j and let wjt > 0. Investor js portfolio is
completely diversified, i.e. θjt,k > 0 for all k. Thus, A
j
t > 0 because at least
one asset pays a strictly positive dividend. Equation (7) implies, together
with the above result that prices in period t+ 1 are non-negative, wjt+1 > 0.
By assumption (A.2) this finding implies λjt+1,k(ω
t+1) > 0 for all k. Since
for each investor with wit > 0, B
i
t,k > 0 for some k, (7) further implies that
wit+1 > 0 for every investor with w
i
t > 0. Obviously, w
i
t+1 = 0 if w
i
t = 0. This
completes the proof. ¤
Proposition 1 ensures that the evolution of the wealth distribution on RI+
is well-defined: for given wt, (11) yields the distribution of wealth wt+1 in the
subsequent period in time.3 We can state the law of motion in the convenient
form
wt+1 = ft(ω
t+1, wt) (14)
where
ft(ω
t+1, wt) =
Id−[λit,k(ωt)wit
λt,k(ωt)wt
]k
i
Λt+1(ω
t+1)
−1 [ K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1)
λit,k(ω
t)wit
λt,k(ωt)wt
]
i
The final step is to derive the law of motion for the investors’ market
shares. This will complete the derivation of the evolutionary stock market
model.
The following assumption is imposed throughout the remainder of this
paper.
(B.1) All investors have the same rate of consumption: λit,0(ω
t) = λt,0(ω
t).
It is clear that, other things being equal, a smaller rate of consumption
leads to a higher growth rate of wealth. Without assumption (B.1) the
evolution of wealth would be biased in favor of investors with a high saving
rate. Since we want to analyze the relative performance of different asset
allocation rules no rule should have an disadvantage in terms of the rate at
which wealth is withdrawn from it.
3Of course assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) are needed. Further, it is convenient to define
wt+1 = (0, ..., 0), if wt = (0, ..., 0).
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Aggregating (7) over investors, one finds
Wt+1 =
K∑
k=1
Dkt+1(ω
t+1) +
K∑
k=1
λt+1,k(ω
t+1)wt+1
= Dt+1(ω
t+1) + (1− λt+1,0(ωt+1)) Wt+1 (15)
where Dt+1(ω
t+1) =
∑K
k=1D
k
t+1(ω
t+1) is the aggregate dividend payment.
The last equality holds because
∑K
k=1 λt+1,k wt+1 =
∑I
i=1
∑K
k=1 λ
i
t+1,k w
i
t+1 =
(1− λt+1,0)
∑I
i=1w
i
t+1.
Equation (15) implies
Wt+1 =
Dt+1(ω
t+1)
λt+1,0(ωt+1)
(16)
The economy grows (or declines) with rate Dt+1(ω
t+1)/(λt+1,0(ω
t+1)Wt).
The growth rate is thus the ratio of the rate at which additional wealth is in-
jected by dividends, Dt+1(ω
t+1)/Wt, to the rate at which wealth is withdrawn
from the process for consumption, λt+1,0(ω
t+1).
The market share of investor i is rit = w
i
t/Wt. Using (16) and exploiting
the particular structure of the variables (8) that define the law of motion
(14), we obtain
rt+1 =
λt+1,0(ω
t+1)
Dt+1(ωt+1)
ft(ω
t+1, rt) (17)
or, equivalently,
rt+1=λt+1,0(ω
t+1)
Id−[λit,k(ωt)rit
λt,k(ωt)rt
]k
i
Λt+1(ω
t+1)
−1[ K∑
k=1
dkt+1(ω
t+1)
λit,k(ω
t)rit
λt,k(ωt)rt
]
i
where
dkt+1(ω
t+1) =
Dkt+1(ω
t+1)
Dt+1(ωt+1)
is the relative dividend payment of asset k. Equation (17) is referred to as
the market selection process.
The wealth of an investor i in any period in time can be derived from her
market share and the aggregate wealth, defined by (16), as
wit+1 =
Dt+1(ω
t+1)
λt+1,0(ωt+1)
rit+1 (18)
The further analysis is restricted to the stationary case. We make the
following assumptions.
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(B.2) Stationary (ergodic) strategies, i.e. λit,k(ω
t) = λik(ω
t), for all i =
1, ..., I and k = 0, 1, ..., K.
(B.3) Stationary (ergodic) relative dividend payments dkt (ω
t) = dk(ωt),
for all k = 1, ..., K.
Assumption (B.3) is fulfilled, for instance, if Dkt+1(ω
t+1) = dk(ωt+1)Wt
with Wt =
∑
iw
i
t, i.e. the dividend payment of every asset has an idiosyn-
cratic component dk(ωt+1) (depending only on the state of nature in the re-
spective period) and an aggregate component Wt. Dividends grow or decline
with the same rate as aggregate wealth.
The last two assumptions ensure that the calender date does not enter in
strategies and dividends, i.e. the model becomes stationary; only the observed
history matters.
Under these assumptions, the market selection process (17) generates a
random dynamical system (Arnold 1998) on the simplex ∆I = {r ∈ RI | ri ≥
0,
∑
i r
i = 1}. For any initial distribution of wealth w0 ∈ RI+, (17) defines
the path of market shares on the event tree with branches ωt. The initial
distribution of market shares is given by (ri0)i = (w
i
0/W0)i. Formally, this
can be stated as follows.
Let Ω denote the set of all realizations ω ∈ SZ. Denote the right-hand
side of (17) by h(ωt+1, rt) : ∆
I → ∆I (it is stationary by assumptions (B)).
Define ϕ(t, ω, r) = h(ωt+1, ·)◦. . . ◦h(ω1, r) for all t ≥ 1, and ϕ(0, ω, r) = r. In
words, ϕ(t, ω, r) is the vector of wealth shares of all investors at time t when
the initial distribution of market shares is r and the sequence of realizations
of states is ω ∈ SZ.
3 Evolutionary Stability
This section introduces the stability concepts needed to analyze the long run
behavior of the wealth shares under the market selection process.
Given a random dynamical system for a set of stationary and adapted
trading strategies (λi), one is particularly interested in those wealth shares
that evolve in a stationary fashion over time. Here we restrict ourselves to
deterministic distributions of market shares that are fixed under the market
selection process (17).4 To specify this notion, we recall the definition of
a deterministic fixed point in the framework of random dynamical systems.
4See e.g. Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) for an application of stochastic invariant distributions
(random fixed points).
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Let a set of strategies (λi) be given, and denote by ϕ the associated random
dynamical system.
Definition 1 r¯ ∈ ∆I is called a (deterministic) fixed point of ϕ if, for all
ω ∈ Ω and all t,
r¯ = ϕ(t, ω, r¯). (19)
The distribution of market shares r¯ is said to be invariant under the market
selection process (17).
By the definition of ϕ(t, ω, r) the condition (19) is equivalent to r¯ =
ϕ(1, ω, r¯) for all ω, i.e. a deterministic state is fixed under the one-step map
if and only if it is fixed under all t-step maps.
It is straightforward to see that the state in which one investor possesses
the entire market does not change over time. In any set of trading strategies
each unit vector in ∆I (i.e. each vertex) is a fixed point. This follows from
Proposition 1 which shows that ri = 0 implies ϕi(t, ω, r) = 0.
Proposition 2 Suppose the dividend and capital gains matrix has full rank
at a deterministic fixed point. Then all investors use the same portfolio rule.
Proof. The result does not require conditions (B.2) and (B.3). (7) and (16)
give
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(λ0 d
k
t+1(ωt+1) + q
k
t+1(ω
t+1))
λit,k(ω
t)rit
qkt (ω
t)
(20)
with
qkt (ω
t) =
I∑
i=1
λit,k(ω
t) rit (21)
Suppose rit+1 = r
i
t = r
i > 0 for all i. Then equation (20) can be written as(
K∑
k=1
[
λ0 d
k
t+1(ωt+1) + q
k
t+1(ω
t+1)
] λit,k(ωt)
qkt (ω
t)
− 1
)
ri = 0 (22)
If the dividend and capital gain matrix
λ0 d
k
t+1(ωt+1) + q
k
t+1(ω
t+1)
has full rank (as a function of k and ωt+1 for each given history ω
t), then
(22) implies λit,k(ω
t) = qkt (ω
t). In light of (21), this means that for all for all
i = 1, ..., I
λit,k =
I∑
j=1
λjt,k r
j
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Hence λi = λj for all i, j. ¤
We are particularly interested in stable fixed points of the market selec-
tion process. Loosely speaking, stability means that small perturbations of
the market shares’ initial distribution do not have a long-run effect. If an
invariant distribution of market shares is stable, every sample path starting
in a neighborhood of this fixed point at time zero is asymptotically identical
to the sample path of the invariant distribution of the wealth shares.
Since fixed points are associated to unique trading strategies (the total
wealth being concentrated on this trading strategy), the natural definition
of a trading strategy’s stability is that of the fixed point’s stability. We will
need different notions of stability, defined as follows.
In the following definition we assume that for any given incumbent strat-
egy λi, the mutant strategy λj is distinct in the sense that with strictly
positive probability λj 6= λi. Moreover, as a matter of notation the first en-
try in the tuple of relative wealth shares r = (ri, rj) refers to the incumbent’s
strategy, while the second refers to the entrant’s wealth share.
Definition 2 A trading strategy λi is called evolutionary stable if, for all
λj, there is a random variable ε > 0 such that limt→∞ ϕi(t, ω, r) = 1 (almost
surely) for all ri ≥ 1− ε (rj = 1− ri ≤ ε).
For each evolutionary stable distribution of market shares there exits an
entry barrier (a random variable here) below which the new portfolio rule
does not drive out the incumbent player. Any perturbation, if sufficiently
small, does not change the long-run behavior of the distribution of market
shares. The market selection process asymptotically leaves the mutant with
no market share. Finally, a corresponding local stability criterion is intro-
duced.
Definition 3 A trading strategy λi is called locally evolutionary stable if for
all λj there exists a random variable δ(ω) > 0 such that λi is evolutionary
stable for all portfolio rules λj with ‖λi(ω)− λj(ω)‖ < δ(ω) for all ω.
A locally evolutionary stable distribution of market shares is evolutionary
stable with respect to local mutations. That is, the strategies that can be
pursued by the mutants are limited to small deviations from existing strate-
gies.
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4 The Main Results
4.1 Simple Strategies
A particular case of the trading strategies considered in this paper are those
being constant over time. This section studies their evolutionary stability.
To analyze evolutionary stability of a trading strategy one has to consider the
random dynamical system (17) with an incumbent (with market share r1t )
and a mutant (with market share r2t = 1−r1t ). The resulting one-dimensional
system is given by
r1t+1=
λ0
δ
[(
1−
K∑
k=1
λ2kθ
2
k
)
K∑
k=1
dk(ωt+1)θ
1
k +
(
K∑
k=1
λ2kθ
1
k
)
K∑
k=1
dk(ωt+1)θ
2
k
]
(23)
with
θ1k =
λ1k r
1
t
λ1k r
1
t + λ
2
k (1− r1t )
, θ2k =
λ2k (1− r1t )
λ1k r
1
t + λ
2
k (1− r1t )
δ =
(
1−
K∑
k=1
λ1k θ
1
k
)(
1−
K∑
k=1
λ2k θ
2
k
)
−
(
K∑
k=1
λ2k θ
1
k
)(
K∑
k=1
λ1k θ
2
k
)
λ1 and λ2 are fixed vectors of percentages with λ10 = λ
2
0 = λ0.
The derivative of the right-hand side of (23) (denoted by h(ωt+1, r
1
t ) which
now only depends on ωt+1 but does not depend on the history ω
t) with respect
to r1t evaluated at r
1
t = 1 can be derived employing some elementary algebra.
One finds
∂h(ωt+1, r
1
t )
∂r1t
(
r1t = 1
)
= 1− λ0 + λ0
K∑
k=1
dk(ωt+1)
λ2k
λ1k
(24)
¿From (24) one can read off the exponential growth rate of the wealth
of investor 2 in a small neighborhood of r1 = 1, i.e. the state in which
investor 1 owns the total market wealth. This growth rate determines the
local stability of this steady state. If the growth rate is negative, investor 2
looses her wealth and the market share of investor 1 tends to one. In this
case the portfolio rule λ1 is stable in the pool (λ1, λ2). If the growth rate is
positive, investor 2 gains wealth and the market share of investor 1 falls. In
this case the portfolio rule λ1 is not stable.
The growth rate is given by
gλ1(λ
2) = E ln
[
1− λ0 + λ0
K∑
k=1
dk(ω0)
λ2k
λ1k
]
(25)
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E denotes the expected value, i.e. integration with respect to the invariant
probability measure P of the stationary dividend process.
We have the following result.
Theorem 1 Let the state of nature be determined by an ergodic process and
let the matrix of relative dividends d have full rank. Suppose investors only
employ simple strategies, i.e. λ(ω) ≡ λ ∈ ∆K+1. Then the simple strategy λ?
defined by, λ?0 = λ0, and
λ∗k = (1− λ0) Edk(ω0) = (1− λ0)
∑
s∈S
ps d
k(s) (26)
for k = 1, ..., K, is evolutionary stable, and no other strategy is locally evo-
lutionary stable.
Proof of Theorem 1. Obviously λ? is a completely mixed strategy, i.e.
λ?k > 0 for all k, and one has
∑K
k=1 λ
?
k = 1− λ0.
It is convenient to use equation (25) to define the auxiliary function,
gβ(α) := E ln
(
1− λ0 + λ0
K∑
k=1
dk(ω0)
αk
βk
)
(27)
with strategies normalized by 1 − λ0 to make
∑K
k=1 αk =
∑K
k=1 βk = 1. For
each fixed strategy β ∈ int∆K ⊂ RK, gβ : int∆K → R. gβ(α) is the Lyapunov
exponent of the distribution of wealth that assigns total wealth to the ‘status
quo’ population that plays strategy β in a market in which α is the only the
alternative strategy.
The first assertion of the theorem follows if we can show that gλ?(α) < 0
for all α ∈ int∆K with α 6= λ?. We will prove that gβ(α) is strictly concave
for all β ∈ int∆K and that gλ?(α) takes on its maximum value at α = λ?.
To ensure strict concavity it suffices to show that α 7→ gβ(α) is strictly
concave on the space RK++, because restriction of the domain to the linear sub-
space int∆K preserves strict concavity. The function ln
∑K
k=1(d
k(ω0)αk/βk)
is concave for all ω and—due to the no-redundancy assumption of full rank for
d—strictly concave on a set of positive measure. Therefore gβ(α) is strictly
concave for each fixed β ∈ int∆K.
λ? is the unique maximum of gλ?(α) on int∆
K if all directional deriva-
tives at this point are zero. To ensure this property, one needs the partial
derivatives of gβ(α). The derivative with respect to the ith component αi is
given by
∂gβ(α)
∂αi
= λ0E
di(ω0)/βi
1− λ0 + λ0
∑K
k=1 d
k(ω0)
αk
βk
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Observe that interchanging integration and differentiation is allowed because
ln(
∑K
k=1 d
k(ω0)αk/βk) is integrable for each fixed α. The last equation im-
plies
∂gλ?(λ
?)
∂αi
= λ0E
di(ω)
λ?i
= λ0E
di(ω)
(1− λ0)Edi ≡
λ0
1− λ0
for all i = 1, ..., K, since
∑K
k=1 d
k(ω) = 1 for all ω.
The directional derivative of gλ? in direction (dα1, ..., dαK) with the re-
striction
∑K
k=1 dαk = 0 (which is a vector in the simplex) is equated as
K∑
i=1
∂gλ?(λ
?)
∂αi
dαi = 0.
Hence any portfolio rule different to λ? is not evolutionary stable.
Let finally prove that any strategy β 6= λ? with β ∈ int∆K cannot be
locally evolutionary stable. A strategy β 6= λ? is not locally evolutionary
stable, if for any neighborhood of β there exists an α such that gβ(α) > 0. It
suffices to show that the directional derivative of gβ at β is strictly positive
in one direction.
Since β 6= λ? and both are points in the simplex there exists i 6= j with
βi > λ
?
i and βj < λ
?
j . Note that we have assumed a minimum of two assets.
The directional derivative of gβ at β in the direction dα given by dαi =
−1/2, dαj = 1/2, and zero otherwise, is given by,
K∑
k=1
∂gβ(β)
∂αk
dαk =
K∑
k=1
Edk
βk
dαk =
1
2
(
λ?j
βj
− λ
?
i
βi
)
> 0.
¤
4.2 Stationary Strategies
We next allow for trading strategies that depend on past observations. The
market selection process for two investors with stationary portfolio rules is
given by
r1t+1=
λ0
δt+1
([
1−
K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kθ
2
t,k
] K∑
k=1
dkt+1θ
1
t,k +
[ K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kθ
1
t,k
] K∑
k=1
dkt+1θ
2
t,k
)
(28)
where λit,k = λ
i
k(ω
t), dkt+1 = d
k(ωt+1) and
θ1t,k =
λ1t,k r
1
t
λ1t,k r
1
t + λ
2
t,k (1− r1t )
, θ2t,k =
λ2t,k (1− r1t )
λ1t,k r
1
t + λ
2
t,k (1− r1t )
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δt+1 =
[
1−
K∑
k=1
λ1t+1,kθ
1
t,k
][
1−
K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kθ
2
t,k
]
−
[ K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kθ
1
t,k
][ K∑
k=1
λ1t+1,kθ
2
t,k
]
The derivative of the right-hand side of (28) with respect to r1t evaluated
at r1t = 1 turns out to be (after some lengthy but elementary calculations)
∂h(ωt+1, r1t )
∂r1t
∣∣∣
r1t=1
=
K∑
k=1
(
λ1k(ω
t+1) + λ0 d
k(ωt+1)
) λ2k(ωt)
λ1k(ω
t)
(29)
The exponential growth rate of investor 2’s market share in a small neigh-
borhood of the state in which investor 1 owns the total market wealth r1 = 1
is given by
gλ1(λ
2) = E ln
[
K∑
k=1
(
λ1k(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
) λ2k(ω0)
λ1k(ω
0)
]
(30)
Observe that in contrast to the case of simple strategies, capital gains are
possible in a fixed point due to changes in the strategy of the incumbent.
4.2.1 IID Case
The first stationary-strategy case to be analyzed in detail is the one in which
state of nature is an i.i.d. process. According to the assumptions made in
the general model, the number of possible states in any one period S is
finite and, under the additional i.i.d. property, each state is drawn with some
probability ps > 0. The history up to some period in time, say t, does
not have an effect on the distribution of the state ωt+1 (which is distributed
according to (p1, ..., pS)).
Two strategies λ1, λ2 are distinct, i.e. λ1 6= λ2, if λ1(ω0) 6= λ2(ω0) on a
set of strictly positive probability.
Theorem 2 Suppose the state of nature is i.i.d. Define the portfolio rule λ∗
by λ∗0 = λ0, and, for k = 1, ..., K,
λ∗k = (1− λ0) Edk = (1− λ0)
∑
s∈S
ps d
k(s). (31)
Instability results
(i) No strategy is stable against λ∗, i.e. gλ(λ∗) ≥ 0.
(ii) If (dk(s))ks has full rank, then every strategy λ 6= λ∗ is locally unstable
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with respect to λ∗, i.e. gλ(λ∗) > 0.
Stability results
(iii) λ∗ is not unstable, i.e. gλ∗(λ) ≤ 0 for every strategy λ.
(iv) If ((1 − λ0)Edk + λ0 dk(s))ks has full rank, then λ∗ is locally stable, i.e.
gλ∗(λ) < 0 for every strategy λ 6= λ∗.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show (ii), pointing out how to derive asser-
tion (i) in the proof. Suppose (dk(s))ks has full rank.
Normalizing strategies with 1 − λ0 to make
∑K
k=1 λk = 1 for notational
simplicity, assertion (ii) requires to show that
gλ(λ
∗) =
∫
SN
g˜(λ∗, λ, ω0) P0(dω0) > 0 (32)
with
g˜(λ∗, λ, ω0) =
∑
s∈S
ps ln
[
K∑
k=1
(
(1− λ0)λk(ω0, s) + λ0 dk(s)
) Edk
λk(ω0)
]
where P0(dω0) is the product measure on SN. This is the representation of
the growth rate (30) in the i.i.d. case.
The Jensen inequality yields
g˜(λ∗, λ, ω0) ≥ (1− λ0)
∑
s∈S
ps ln
[
K∑
k=1
λk(ω
0, s)
Edk
λk(ω0)
]
(33)
+ λ0
∑
s∈S
ps ln
[
K∑
k=1
dk(s)
Edk
λk(ω0)
]
(34)
Consider the term (34) first. If λ(ω0) = λ∗, then (34) is equal to zero
because
∑
k d
k(s) = 1. For any λ(ω0) 6= λ∗, one has∑
s∈S
ps ln
[
K∑
k=1
dk(s)
Edk
λk(ω0)
]
> 0
see Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2003, Theorem 1). The strict inequality follows
from the full rank assumption. Without this assumption the term (34) can
be equal to zero even if the strategies are distinct when evaluated at ω0.
Consider next the term on the right of (33). Application of the Jensen
inequality yields
ln
(
K∑
k=1
λk(ω
0, s)
Edk
λk(ω0)
)
≥
K∑
k=1
Edk ln
(
λk(ω
0, s)
λk(ω0)
)
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Thus∫
SN
∑
s∈S
ps ln
(
K∑
k=1
λk(ω
0, s)
Edk
λk(ω0)
)
P0(dω0)
≥
K∑
k=1
Edk
(∫
SN
lnλk(ω
1) P0(dω1)−
∫
SN
lnλk(ω
0) P0(dω0)
)
= 0
The assumption that λ(ω0) 6= λ∗ with strictly positive probability yields
validity of (32), i.e. gλ(λ
∗) > 0. This proves the instability results.
We next prove the stability results (iii) and (iv). Analogously to the
above, we only consider (iv) in detail and point out how to derive (iii).
Using the normalization of strategies introduced in the proof of (ii), the
growth rate can be written as
gλ∗(λ) =
∫
SN
g¯(λ(ω0), λ∗) P0(dω0) (35)
with
g¯(λ, λ∗) =
∑
s∈S
ps ln
[
K∑
k=1
(
1− λ0 + λ0 d
k(s)
Edk
)
λk
]
(36)
g¯(λ, λ∗) is a concave function of λ ∈ ∆K . Moreover, if [(1 − λ0)Edk +
λ0 d
k(s)] has full rank then so has [(1− λ0)Edk + λ0 dk(s)]/Edk = (1− λ0) +
λ0 (d
k(s)/Edk) and, thus, g¯(λ, λ∗) is even strictly concave in λ ∈ ∆K .
Assertion (iv) is immediate if we can show that the maximum of λ 7→
g¯(λ, λ∗) over ∆K is equal to zero, and further that this maximum is attained
at λ = λ∗. Under the full rank assumption, strict concavity ensures that the
maximizer λ = λ∗ is unique. Clearly, g¯(λ∗, λ∗) = 0. This implies g¯(λ, λ∗) <
0 if λ 6= λ∗. Thus, if λ(ω0) 6= λ∗ with strictly positive probability, then
g(λ, λ∗) < 0.
If the rank is not full, then any variation of λ that leaves
∑
k[(1−λ0)Edk+
λ0 d
k(s)]/Edk λk unchanged for all s (i.e. in the direction of linearly depen-
dent columns) also attains the maximum. Thus we can only conclude that
gλ∗(λ) ≤ 0, which is (iii).
We use the property that g¯(λ, λ∗) is continuously differentiable in λ. λ =
λ∗ is a critical point of g¯(λ, λ∗) if
K∑
n=1
∂g¯(λ, λ∗)
∂λn
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
dλn = 0 (37)
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for all
∑
n dλn = 0. Then the tangent space at λ
∗ is parallel to the sim-
plex ∆K . Concavity ensures that g¯(λ, λ∗) cannot take on values higher than
g¯(λ∗, λ∗) = 0.
One has
∂g¯(λ, λ∗)
∂λn
=
∑
s∈S
ps
((1− λ0)Edn + λ0 dn(s)) /Edn∑K
k=1 ((1− λ0)Edk + λ0 dk(s)) λk/Edk
Thus
K∑
n=1
∂g¯(λ, λ∗)
∂λn
∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
dλn =
K∑
n=1
∑
s∈S
ps
(1− λ0)Edn + λ0 dn(s)
Edn
dλn
=
K∑
n=1
(1− λ0)Edn + λ0 Edn
Edn
dλn =
K∑
n=1
dλn = 0
This ensures g¯(λ(ω0), λ∗) ≤ 0 for all λ(ω0), and g¯(λ(ω0), λ∗) < 0 for all
λ(ω0) 6= λ∗. Thus, if λ(ω0) 6= λ∗ on a set of strictly positive measure,
gλ∗(λ) < 0. This proves (iv). ¤
Lemma 1 Suppose (dk(s))ks has full rank. Then full rank condition in The-
orem 2 (iv) (i.e. ((1− λ0)Edk + λ0 dk(s))ks has full rank) holds, if
min
s
ps > (1/2− λ0)/(1− λ0) (38)
In particular, (38) is fulfilled if λ0 > 1/2. The condition holds for all 0 <
λ0 < 1 in the two state i.i.d. case with uniform distribution (S = {1, 2} and
p1 = p2 = 1/2).
Proof of Lemma 1. The matrix ((1−λ0)Edk+λ0 dk(s))ks can be written as
[(1−λ0)pi+λ0 Id] d where pi is the matrix with all rows given by (p1, ..., pS) and
d = (dk(s))ks . If d has full rank then it suffices to show that [(1−λ0)pi+λ0 Id]
also has full rank.
The condition for a column dominant diagonal of the transposed of ((1−
λ0)Edk + λ0 dk(s))ks with weighing vector (1, ..., 1) reads (1 − λ0) ps + λ0 >∑
u6=s(1− λ0) pu. The last term is equal to (1− λ0) (1− ps). This inequality
is equivalent to (38). ¤
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4.2.2 Markov Case
This section extends the main result in the i.i.d. case to the model with
Markov dividend payments.
Let Π denote the matrix of transition probabilities.
The growth rate of strategy λ2 at λ1-prices (30) is equal to
gλ1(λ
2) =
∫
SN
∑
s∈S
piω0s ln
[
K∑
k=1
(
λ1k(ω
0s) + λ0 d
k(s)
) λ2k(ω0)
λ1k(ω
0)
]
P(dω0) (39)
If also strategies were Markov then we would have,
gλ1(λ
2) =
∑
s,s˜∈S
ps piss˜ ln
[
K∑
k=1
(
λ1k(s˜) + λ0 d
k(s˜)
) λ2k(s)
λ1k(s)
]
(40)
The convention for notation of conditional expected values is E(λ∗ | s) =∑
s′ piss′ λ
∗(s′).
Theorem 3 Suppose the state of nature is governed by a Markov process
with strictly positive transition probabilities piss˜ > 0 for all s, s˜. Define the
stationary portfolio rule λ∗ by λ∗0 = λ0 and, for all s ∈ S and all k = 1, ..., K,
λ∗ = (1− λ0)λ0 [Id− (1− λ0)pi]−1 pi d (41)
Instability results
(i) Every strategy λ 6= λ∗ is not stable against some arbitrarily close strategy
µ, i.e. gλ(µ) ≥ 0.
(ii) If, in addition to (i), ([(1−λ0)λk(ω0, s)+λ0 dk(s)]/λk(ω0))ks has full rank
for almost all ω0, then gλ(µ) > 0.
Stability results
(iii) λ∗ is not unstable, i.e. gλ∗(λ) ≤ 0 for every strategy λ.
(iv) If ([(1 − λ0)E(λ∗ | s) + λ0 E(dk | s)]/λ∗(s))ks has full rank, then λ∗ is
locally stable, i.e. gλ∗(λ) < 0 for every strategy λ 6= λ∗.
The existence of the inverse in (41) follows immediately from the property
that Id− (1− λ0)pi has a row dominant diagonal (recall that 0 < λ0 < 1).
Remark 1 (i) λ∗ is a Markov strategy.
(ii) The strategy λ∗ defined in (41) is a fundamentalist’s portfolio rule
in the sense that the fraction of wealth assigned to each asset is equal to the
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expected value of the discounted (relative) dividends. To see this, consider
the alternative representation of λ∗,
λ∗ = λ0
∞∑
m=1
(1− λ0)m pim d (42)
Equivalence of (41) and (42) is immediate by noting that the latter is a
geometric series.
The strategy λ∗ satisfies
E(λ∗k | s) + λ0 E(dk | s) = 1/(1− λ0)λ∗k(s)
for all k and all s. It “balances” capital and dividend gains.
Proof of Theorem 3. As in the proof of Theorem 2 we normalize all
strategies to achieve
∑K
k=1 λk = 1.
Using (39), we can write the growth rate of strategy µ at λ-prices as
gλ(µ) =
∫
SN
g˜(µ(ω0), λ(ω0), ω0)P(dω0) (43)
with
g˜(µ(ω0), λ(ω0), ω0) =
∑
s∈S
piω0s ln
[
K∑
k=1
[
(1− λ0)λk(ω0, s) + λ0 dk(s)
] µk(ω0)
λk(ω0)
]
Analogously to the discussion in the proof of Theorem 2, one finds that,
for every fixed ω0, g˜ is a concave function of µ(ω0) ∈ ∆K . Under the full
rank assumption in (ii), it is even strictly concave.
One further has
∂g˜
∂µn(ω0)
=
∑
s∈S
piω0s
[(1− λ0)λn(ω0, s) + λ0 dn(s)] /λn(ω0)∑K
k=1 [(1− λ0)λk(ω0, s) + λ0 dk(s)] µk(ω0)/λk(ω0)
Thus
K∑
n=1
(
∂g˜
∂µn(ω0)
∣∣∣
µ(ω0)=λ(ω0)
)
dµn(ω
0)
=
K∑
n=1
∑
s∈S piω0s [(1− λ0)λn(ω0, s) + λ0 dn(s)]
λn(ω0)
dµn(ω
0) (44)
for every dµ1(ω
0), ..., dµK(ω
0) with
∑K
n=1 dµn(ω
0) = 0.
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Denote by Ω˜ the set of strictly positive measure on which λ 6= λ∗. We
show that for each ω0 ∈ Ω˜, (44) is strictly positive for some (dµ1(ω0), ..., dµK(ω0))
with
∑K
n=1 dµn(ω
0) = 0. This property implies that there is some µ with
g˜(µ(ω0), λ(ω0), ω0) > 0 on Ω˜. Defining µ(ω
0) = λ(ω0) for all ω0 such that
λ(ω0) = λ∗(ω0), we obtain a strategy µ that is arbitrarily close to λ. By
construction this strategy satisfies gλ(µ) > 0, which verifies assertion (i).
Measurability of µ follows from the fact that, due to finiteness of S, the
sigma algebra of the probability space under consideration is the power set,
and, thus, every function is measurable.
It is clear that (44) is strictly positive for some (dµ1(ω
0), ..., dµK(ω
0))
with
∑K
n=1 dµn(ω
0) = 0 if and only if∑
s∈S piω0s [(1− λ0)λn(ω0, s) + λ0 dn(s)]
λn(ω0)
(45)
is not constant in n (for given ω0).
We will show that (45) is constant, i.e.∑
s∈S
piω0s
[
(1− λ0)λn(ω0, s) + λ0 dn(s)
]
= cλn(ω
0)
for all n, if and only if λ = λ∗.
Taking the sum over n on both sides of the last equality shows that c = 1.
The condition that (45) is constant therefore becomes∑
s∈S
piω0s
[
(1− λ0)λn(ω0, s) + λ0 dn(s)
]
= λn(ω
0) (46)
It is important to point out that assertion (iii) and (iv) are immediate once
this result is derived. The procedure is completely analogous to the proof
of Theorem 2. The growth rate g˜(λ(ω0), λ∗(ω0)ω0) is a concave function
(strictly concave under the full rank assumption in (iv)). Thus if (46) is
constant if and only if λ = λ∗, then gλ∗(λ) takes on its maximum, which is
zero, at λ = λ∗. This is (iii) resp. (iv).
To show that (46) holds if and only if λ = λ∗, we need to consider three
distinct cases: (a) λ(ω0) does not depend on ω0; (b) λ(ω0) depends only on
a finite history, i.e. λ(ω0) = λ(ω−T , ..., ω0) for some T ≥ 0; and (c) λ(ω0)
depends on an infinite history.
Case (a): (45) becomes
(1− λ0)λn + λ0 E(dn | ω0) = λn (47)
which is equivalent to E(dn | ω0) = λn. If, as we have assumed in the
Theorem, the dividend process is a non-degenerate Markov process, µ has to
depend on ω0. This is a contradiction.
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Case (b): Obviously, if λ(ω0) is only a function of ω0, then λ = λ
∗. For a
strategy λ(ω0) that depends on a history of length T ≥ 1 (45) becomes∑
s∈S
piω0s [(1− λ0)λn(ω−T+1, ..., ω0, s) + λ0 dn(s)] = λn(ω−T , ..., ω0) (48)
If λn would vary with ω−T , (48) could not hold for all ω0. Thus (48) implies
that λ(ω0) = λ(ω−T+1, ..., ω0). Repeated application shows that λ(ω0) =
λ(ω0). However, this implies λ = λ
∗, as discussed above.
Case (c): (45) reads∑
ω1∈S
piω0ω1
[
(1− λ0)λn(ω1) + λ0 dn(ω1)
]
= λn(ω
0) (49)
An analogous equation holds with λn(ω
1) on the right-hand side,∑
ω2∈S
piω1ω2
[
(1− λ0)λn(ω2) + λ0 dn(ω2)
]
= λn(ω
1) (50)
Inserting (50) in (49) yields
λn(ω
0) = (1−λ0)2 pi2ω0ω2 λn(ω2)+λ0
[
(1− λ0)
∑
ω2
pi2ω0ω2 d
n(ω2) +
∑
ω1
pi1ω0ω1 d
n(ω1)
]
(51)
where pimω0ωm =
∑
ω1,...,ωm
piω0ω1 ...piωm−1ωm .
Repeating this procedure and observing that
(1− λ0)m
∑
ωm
pimω0ωm λn(ω
m)→ 0 as m→∞
we find
λn(ω
0) =
λ0
1− λ0
∞∑
m=1
(1− λ0)m
∑
ωm
pimω0ωm d
n(ωm) (52)
Thus λn(ω
0) is a function of ω0 only, implying that λ = λ
∗, as discussed in
case (b). The equivalence of (52) and the definition of λ∗ in the Theorem 3
has been established in Remark 1. ¤
5 Mean-Variance Optimization
In this section we analyze the evolutionary stability of portfolio rules based
on mean-variance optimization. The mutual fund theorem states that given
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all investors build portfolios according to the mean-variance-criterion, then
every investor will hold a combination of the riskless asset and the market
portfolio in any capital market equilibrium. Even though it is very question-
able whether indeed all investors use mean-variance-optimization, investing
a big share of wealth in the market portfolio is a very common behavior.
We extend our previous model by incorporating a strategy that enables
an investor to buy the market portfolio. This extension relates our model to
the classical CAPM5 results.
It is well known that in practice mean-variance portfolios are often under-
diversified, i.e. they typically put positive weight on very few assets only. To
cure this defect it is then usually suggested to modify the mean-variance port-
folio by devoting some positive but small share of the budget on every asset in
the portfolio, ensuring that the portfolio is completely mixed. We show in the
section 5.2 that this commonly used “quick fix” of the under-diversification
problem is indeed an improvement of the mean-variance portfolio.
5.1 The CAPM strategy
This subsection uses the very general framework with non-autonomous strate-
gies (17). However, we make assumption (A.1).
Buying the market portfolio means to imitate the “population mix.” In
particular if one investment strategy gains then the market-portfolio investor
assigns more weight to the corresponding strategy. The investor holding the
market portfolio has constant market share.
Consider an investor, say γ = I + 1, who wants to buy a fraction of
the market portfolio. The market portfolio is the vector of total stocks of
each asset, here the initial supply of one unit of each asset. In terms of an
investment strategy buying the market portfolio requires to divide wealth
proportional to the asset prices, i.e.,
λγt,k = (1− λt,0)
pkt∑K
l=1 p
l
t
where k = 1, ..., K. This trading strategy depends on the equilibrium prices
in the current period. An investor who buys the market portfolio has there-
fore to give a demand function to the auctioneer. This calls for an extension
of our previous analysis.
5See also Sciubba (1999) for an analysis of CAPM-trading rules in the original Blume
and Easley (1992) setup with diagonal securities.
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Suppose all other investors pursue trading strategies λit(ω
t) ∈ ∆K , i =
1, ..., I. Then the market-clearing condition (6) becomes,
pkt = λt,k wt + (1− λ0)
pkt∑K
l=1 p
l
t
wγt (53)
where wt = (w
1
t , ..., w
I
t ). Since
∑K
l=1 p
l
t = (1 − λt,0)Wt, we obtain for the
normalized price qkt = p
k
t /Wt the condition
qkt = λt,k rt + q
k
t r
γ
t (54)
Thus
qkt =
1
1− rγt
λt,k rt (55)
The portfolio of the CAPM investor is therefore given by
θγt,k = r
γ
t for all k = 1, ..., K (56)
Writing (17) in the form of (7) gives for investor γ
rγt+1 =
K∑
k=1
(
λt+1,0 d
k
t+1(ω
t+1) + qkt+1(ω
t+1)
)
rγt (57)
Since
K∑
k=1
dkt+1(ω
t+1) = 1 and
K∑
k=1
qkt+1(ω
t+1) = 1− λt+1,0 (58)
one finds that
rγt+1 = r
γ
t .
Summarizing our findings we can state the following result.
Proposition 3 The market share of a CAPM investor is constant in any
population in which all other players pursue simple strategies. In particular,
a CAPM investor will never vanish nor dominate the market.
The intuition behind this result is given by the representation of the
normalized market-clearing price in the model with only simple strategies,
qkt =
∑I
i=1 λ
i
k r
i
t. The normalized equilibrium price equals the relative market
wealth invested in that asset. If one player dominates the market in the
long-run and asymptotically own the entire market wealth, the asset price
will reflect the trading strategy of this investor. The CAPM investor mimics
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this strategy because he distributes his wealth according to the relative value
of the assets.
¿From an evolutionary point of view it can be concluded that investing in
the market portfolio is a strategy with strong resistance against the market
selection mechanism. Hence even though buying the market portfolio may
not be in accordance with mean-variance optimization (because not every-
body uses it) it is a convenient rule which automatically imitates the most
successful trading strategy!
5.2 Diversification
In this subsection we show that under-diversification is fatal for evolutionary
stability. This result follows readily from the expressions of the Lyapunov-
exponent, equation (24), that we have derived above.
Corollary 1 Suppose λˆ is an under-diversified strategy, i.e. for at least one
k, λˆk(ω
0) = 0 and dk(ω1) > 0 on a set of strictly positive probability. Denote
by λˆεk := (1− ε)λˆk + (1− λ0)ε/K, 0 < ε ≤ 1, the corresponding ε-completed
strategy. Then λˆε is robust against λˆ-mutants for all sufficiently small ε > 0,
i.e. the distribution of wealth shares that assigns total wealth to the λˆε-player
is stable in the population (λˆε, λˆ).
Even though using the “quick fix” to prevent under-diversification is bet-
ter than investing according to the under-diversified portfolio rule, it is clear
from the main result Theorem 1, that ε-completed under-diversified simple
strategies are not locally stable (if they do not coincide with λ?). However,
we next show that the situation for ε-completed portfolio rules λˆε is even
worse. Any completely mixed simple strategy drives out λˆε for all small
enough ε > 0.
Corollary 2 Given any completely diversified strategy λc (uniformly in ω
bounded away from zero) and any under-diversified strategy λˆ. Then λˆε,
defined in Corollary 1, is not robust against λc-mutants for all sufficiently
small ε > 0, i.e. the distribution of wealth shares that assigns total wealth to
the λˆε-player is not stable in the population (λˆε, λc).
Proof of Corollary 1. We need to show that the growth rate, defined in
(30), satisfies
E ln
( K∑
k:λˆ(ω0)k>0
[
λˆεk(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
] λˆk(ω0)
(1− ε)λˆk(ω0) + (1− λ0) ε/K
)
< 0
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for all small ε > 0. The left-hand side of this equation is strictly increased by
omitting ε/K in the denominator. We thus obtain the sufficient condition,
E ln
( ∑
k:λˆ(ω0)k>0
[
λˆεk(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
])
≤ ln(1− ε) (59)
One has∑
k:λˆk(ω0)>0
[
λˆεk(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
]
≤ (1− λ0) + λ0
∑
k:λˆk(ω0)>0
dk(ω1) ≤ 1
for all events, where last inequality is strict for all ω such that dk(ω1) >
0 while λˆk(ω
0) = 0 for some k. Since the latter holds according to the
assumption in the corollary, the left-hand side of (59) turns out to be strictly
negative. Therefore (59) is satisfied for all small enough ε. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2. One has to show that
E ln
(
K∑
k=1
[
λˆεk(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
] λck(ω0)
λˆεk(ω
0)
)
> 0 (60)
for all small ε > 0.
Noting that the bracketed term in (60) is equal to
∑
k:λˆk(ω0)>0
(
λˆεk(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
)
λck(ω
0)
(1− ε)λˆk(ω0) + (1− λ0)ε/K
+
∑
k:λˆk(ω0)=0
(
λˆεk(ω
1) + λ0 d
k(ω1)
)
λck(ω
0)
(1− λ0)ε/K
The first term is bounded away from zero uniformly in ε. The second term
tends to infinity as ε→ 0. Since for some k, λˆk(ω0) = 0 with strictly positive
probability according to our assumptions, one finds that the left-hand side
of (60) tends to infinity as ε→ 0. ¤
6 Conclusion
We have studied the evolution of wealth shares of portfolio rules in incom-
plete markets with long-lived assets. Prices are determined endogenously.
The performance of a portfolio rule in the process of repeated reinvestment
of wealth is determined by the wealth share eventually conquered in compe-
tition with other portfolio rules. Using random dynamical systems theory,
we derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the evolutionary stability
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of portfolio rules. In the case of Markov (in particular i.i.d.) payoffs these
local stability conditions lead to a simple portfolio rule that is the unique
evolutionary stable strategy. This rule possesses an explicit representation
as it invests proportionally to the expected relative dividends. Moreover, it
is demonstrated that mean-variance optimization is not evolutionary stable
while the CAPM-rule always imitates the best portfolio rule and survives.
These results are first steps towards a general evolutionary theory of port-
folio selection. Future research may focus on the following generalizations of
our results:
• simultaneous mutants:
The concept of evolutionary stability that we have used considers one
mutant at a time. By restricting attention to simpler stage games like
bi-matrix games, evolutionary game theory has derived very interesting
results for the case of arbitrary many mutants (see Friedman (2001),
for example.) Since for the case of short-lived assets Hens and Schenk-
Hoppe´ (2003) have recently demonstrated evolutionary stability of λ∗
with arbitrary many mutants there is some hope to also get this result
for the case of long-lived assets.
• non-stationary dividends:
Having shown the advantages of the relative dividends rule λ∗ one may
wonder why portfolio selection in real stock markets is still under de-
bate. One reason may be that dividend are not stationary ergodic.
Indeed for Dow-Jones data, for example, we have found severe non-
stationarity in the dividends process. It is interesting to see how λ∗
could be adapted to locally stationary processes for example.
• global stability:
With long-lived assets λ∗ is the unique evolutionary stable strategy.
Also we have shown that λ∗ can destabilize any incumbent portfolio
rule. However, so far we have not shown that ,as in the case of short-
lived assets, starting from any initial position, the market selection
process converges to λ∗.
• price dependent portfolio rules:
The most general portfolio rules we have allowed for are stationary
strategies adapted to the information filtration. Simple momentum
rules like “buy (sell) if prices have gone up (down)” are not in the class
of rules we studied since through the price path non-stationarities can
enter the portfolio rules. Note that momentum rules were for example
studied in interaction with rules based on rational expectations in Brock
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and Hommes (1997). It is very interesting to see whether our market
selection process (17) may generate results similar to theirs.
• short sales:
We have ruled out short sales for the technical reason to ensure that
prices remain positive. Alternatively one could let 0 be a lower bar-
rier for asset prices. This would however change the market selection
process in a non-smooth way.
• liquidity shocks:
We have studied consumption proportionally to wealth. If one of the
investor is for example an insurance company then from time to time
she will need to withdraw large amounts of cash independent of the
current wealth.
• alternative market structures:
In our paper the market is organized by a batched auction. In every
period every portfolio rule submits its budget shares to some auction-
eer who then determines prices as the wealth average of the strategies
portfolio rules. Some financial markets are indeed organized this way.
For example the opening and the closing auctions on the German stock
exchange operate similarly. However, more common market structures
are double-auctions or a market maker systems. As Bottazzi, Dosi,
and Rebesco (2003) have recently shown, the dynamics of evolutionary
models may well depend on the specific market organization chosen.
It is interesting to see how the wealth selection process studied here is
affected by the choice of the market structure.
• strategic interaction:
The best strategy is of course the strategy that tries to exploit the
other strategies in the market.6 A natural question to ask is therefore
what the Nash-equilibrium is in a game corresponding to the market
selection process (17). Obviously, the Nash equilibrium depends on
the preferences of the investors. Recently Hens, Reimann, and Vogt
(2003) have shown that all investors playing λ∗ in every period is a
Nash-equilibrium if all investors maximize expected utility functions
with correct beliefs about the occurrence of the states provided assets
are short lived and there is no aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k d
k(s) =
∑
k d
k(z)
for all s, z, or assets are short lived and all investors have logarithmic
preferences. Moreover, for the case of Arrow-securities, Alo´s-Ferrer and
6“The best plan is ... to profit by the folly of others.” Pliny the Elder, from John
Barlett, comp. Familiar Quotations, 9th ed. 1901.
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Ania (2003) have shown that in this setting λ∗ is the unique evolution-
ary stable strategy in the sense of Schaffer (1988). These results show
that our approach can also be viewed as an evolutionary justification
for Nash equilibria of certain market games. It is interesting to see
whether these results still hold for general payoff structures.
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